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1. Introduction 
On two different occasions between August 2004 and January 2005 the Maasai 
pastoralists of Kenya surfaced in the mass media, both print and electronic. 
August 15, 2004 was exactly 100 years after the signing of the controversial agreement 
between the British Government and the Maasai which allowed British settlers to allocate  
land to themselves in Kenya at the expense of the Maasai. Claiming that the agreement 
had expired, the Maasai demonstrated across the Rift Valley and in the capital of Kenya, 
Nairobi. They also invaded privately own ranches in Laikipia District. 
In the bid to protect private property and maintain peace in the country, the Government 
reacted by arresting several Maasai. In the process the police, reportedly, killed a Maasai. 
Secondly, a simmering conflict between Maasai pastoralists and Kikuyu farmers erupted 
in January 2005 in Mai Mahiu and Mandera locations. In this conflict at least 40 people 
lost their precious lives, dozens were serious injured and hundreds fled their homes. 
Properties worth millions of dollars were destroyed (The Standard, February 14, 2005). 
These two incidents of conflicts are principally based on landedresources, especially land 
and water. This paper is an attempt to describe the historical background of the conflicts 
and their implications to the survival of the Maasai in both Kenya and Tanzania. 
Traditionally the Maasai were pastoralists raising mainly cattle but also small stock such 
as goats and sheep. Given their tolerant attitude towards wildlife, they lived side by side 
with wildlife. When Europeans came to Africa all of them were, literally, carrying guns. 
A hunting spree was sustained for decades. They nearly wiped out wildlife. Later, some 
wise colonists advocated wildlife conservation. This proved to mean appropriation of 
Maasai rangelands to create national parks and game reserves (Parkipuny, 1991). 
Wildlife conservation was, however, not the only source of Maasai predicament. Large-
scale settler agriculture especially in Kenya was another. Beside, British colonial 
Government considered the Maasai way of life as primitive and was determined to deal 
with it as such (Keiwua, 2002). In effect other forms of land uses were encouraged at the 
expense of Maasai pastoralism which was condemned as ‘primitive.’ 
After ‘independence’ in both Kenya and Tanganyika1 the Maasai dilemma surprisingly 
increased instead of diminishing. The Governments in the two countries retained the 
colonial mentality against pastoralism (Fosbrooke, 1972). The so-called ‘national 
interest’ disarmed the Maasai of their land in Tanzania (Shivji, 1998). In Kenya, 
politicians, the rich, and British settlers as well as wildlife conservationists chopped off 
large chunks of what used to be the Maasai territory (Rutten, 1992). 
So much so that one often hears the question: ‘Will the Maasai survive or perish?’ This 
article answers the question focusing on the suffering of the Maasai in Kenya and 
Tanzania. This does not mean that others have not suffered in the two countries. To be 
sure, there are volumes and volumes of books unearthing countless sickening sufferings 
in the two countries. But the Maasai suffering has rarely been acknowledged. 
                                                 
1 Tanganyika ‘united’ with Zanzibar to form Tanzania in April 1964. 
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2. Maasai 
Western historians and anthropologists have, seemingly, deliberately, ignored the Maasai 
point of view and have written Maasai history wrongly. 
This part aims to correct, in summary, the myths about the Maasai. It is for the people 
who wish to know the Maasai, not as ‘a powerful tribe of arrogant fierce savages’ or ‘a 
curious attractive group that performs ancient war dances while dressed up in outlandish 
attire,’ but as a people with a soul, a history, and a future in a remarkable sort of way. 
European writers corrupted the word Maasai to Masai. Sadly, many of contemporary 
African writers; go on with this error. Do the Maasai originate from Egypt? According to 
historians they are coming from ‘far away in the North.’ But exactly where the origin of 
the Maasai is is something no living person today can honestly profess to know (Sokoine, 
1981). The wide knowledge of the Maasai, extending far beyond the borders of East 
Africa is ‘too often a distorted image and an unduly romanticised one’ (Parkipuny, 1975). 
Few tribes have attracted as much attention as the Maasai. Historians and anthropologists 
have written volumes and volumes about the Maasai, yet they have failed to puncture the 
image created by more romantically inclined observers (Adams & McShane, 1992). How 
did the strange writing about the Maasai begin? The classic colonial modus operandi was 
to first commence by exploration of the lands to be stolen. The likes of Dr David 
Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley came to Africa. They returned from Africa with 
weird stories of ‘savages capering around boiling pots of human flesh.’ 
These were followed by missionaries who introduced Christianity to the Maasai. Two 
Germans, Dr. Ludwing Krapf and Rev. John Rebman members of the Church Missionary 
Society are believe to be the first Europeans to contact the Maasai in the late 1840s. 
Krapf published a book titled Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours in 1860 
which probably contains the first written description of the Maasai. He wrote: 
They live entirely on milk, butter, honey and the meat of black [sic!] cattle, goats and 
sheep...they are dreaded as warriors, laying all waste with fire and sword, so that the weaker 
tribes do not venture to resist them in the open field, but leave them in possession of their herds, 
and seek only to save themselves by the quickest possible flight. 
Then the British Royal Geographic Society sent Joseph Thomson to East Africa. In his 
book Thomson described his first encounter with the Maasai in these words: ‘We soon set 
our eyes upon the dreaded warriors that had so long been the subject of my waking 
dreams, and I could not but involuntarily exclaim, “What splendid fellows” as I surveyed 
a band of the most peculiar race of men to be found in Africa’ (Thomson, 1885). Isak 
Dinesen was a fervent admirer of the Maasai. She writes, ‘A Maasai warrior is a fine 
sight.’ In effect Dinesen played a role in carrying the stereotype about the Maasai to the 
extremes. In her book titled Out of Africa published in 1972 she said: 
Those young men have, to the utmost extent, that particular form of intelligence which we call 
chic; daring, and wildly fantastical as they seem, they are still unswervingly true to their own 
nature, and to an imminent ideal. Their style is not an assumed manner, nor an imitation of a 
foreign perfection; it has grown from the inside, and is an expression of the race and its history, 
and…weapons and finery are as much a part of their being as are a stag’s antlers. 
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So effective has been this portrayal that many contemporary African writers still view the 
Maasai through this jaundiced prism. In his No More Lies about Africa, for example, 
Musamaali Nangoli joins the cult by navigating far away from the very title of his book: 
For the Masai…a young boy of about sixteen coffee seasons throws himself into the bush bare-
handed and kills a lion in order to become a man (Nangoli, 2002:59). 
With the possible exception of the Biblical Samson a human being cannot kill a lion 
bare-handed. It is important however to explain briefly the Maasai social set-up. 
Maasai means speakers of Maa dialects. There are several sub-sections that speak Maa 
(MAA, 2004). Some whose remnants still exist today are IlPurko, ISalei, IlKisonko, 
ILumbwa, ISikirari, IlKaputie, ILoodokilani, ILarusa, IlDamat, IlMatapato, ILaitayiok, 
IlLoitai, ISiria, IlUasin Nkishu, IlDalalekutuk, IlKeekonyokie, IlKankere, IlMoitanik and 
many others. Some have been ‘wiped out’ in tribal conflicts. For example Ildikiri, Ilkoli, 
Iloogol-ala, Ilaikipiak and Ilosekelai sub-sections have been ‘eliminated’ (Kulet, 1972). 
There are several clans, injomiei, in the Maasai society. There are two major clans of 
society. One is Oodo Mong’i, Red Cow and the other is Orok Kiteng, Black Cow. Within 
each clan, there are sub-clans, ilpaasheta. Sub-clans in Oodo Mong’i clan are Ilmolelian, 
Ilmakesen and Iltarosero while Ilaiser and Ilukumai are the sub-clans in Orok Kiteng 
clan. It is noteworthy that members of the same clan respected one another in a brotherly 
way. A man could not for example marry a woman of his clan because the community 
considered her his sister - a great abomination in the eyes of the Maasai. 
The Maasai men are organised by a system based on age set, olporo. Under this system 
all the boys, on attaining the age of sixteen or thereabouts, are circumcised and accepted 
into a particular age-set, a unit possessing a single name and a sense of unity. There 
follows the happiest time of a Maasai man’s life. The warrior is not only expected to 
express the best of human virtues, but also to feel that he is inferior to no one. 
Romantically inclined writers talk of the ‘military power of the Masai.’ But that suggests 
an organised military machine under a single command implementing a national policy. 
No such ‘nation wide’ co-ordination existed. There is not, nor did there ever exist, a 
single ‘chief’ of the Maasai, at the apex of the pyramid (Parkipuny, 1975)2. 
Before the introduction of a unified national leadership system hinged on the 
organisational structure of western societies, Maasai, like other societies in Africa, had its 
own system of organisation and leadership. There were no rulers but there were leaders. 
For every sub-tribe each age group had a leader, olaigwanani plural is ilaigwanak 
‘elected’ by the largest possible assembly of the members of the group. There was also a 
deputy leader engopiro - plural is ingopir. Such leaders were ‘elected’ and functioned 
only in and through the youth age of the group, murano. Besides youth leaders there were 
also sub-tribal leaders. Again not rulers, but spokesmen. Same with their deputies. The 
leadership functions of these spokesmen transcended the age group segmentation. 
Neither ilaigwanak nor any other person had the power to enforce judgement or order. It 
was the weight of public opinion which compelled the individuals to act as required (for a 
fuller account of this see Kulet, 1972). In 1933, the British enlisted the medicine men, 
                                                 
2 The British and Germans confused Oloiboni to be the Chief. He was a medicine-man and rain-maker. 
Though his position enjoyed prestige in the Maasai society he could not claim any political authority. 
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iloibonok, on the pay roll as ‘chiefs of the Masai’ hoping that at long last they had found 
the right agents for responsive indirect rule. But the British efforts were in vain. Though 
the medicine man position enjoyed prestige and influence in the society they could not 
claim any resemblance of tradition to wielding executive authority. In no time the Maasai 
came out in protest over the manipulation and insisted that the medicine men should keep 
out, far way from leadership (Parkipuny, 1975:64). 
Contrary to the popular belief the Maasai do not live on a diet of milk and blood. True, 
the warriors consume these foods extensively, plus the meat eaten at the meat feasts held 
in special camps, ilpuli. The elders, women and young folk eat considerable amounts of 
agricultural crops, cereals, beans, bananas and others. Warriors take these foods too. But 
they do it secretly as food not obtained from livestock is viewed as inferior (Ibid.). The 
Maasai obtained these from the hill dwellers at barter markets at numerous points in the 
foothills where highlands and plains meet (Kivasis, 1953 & Hollis, 1905). 
Maasai lived a pastoral life and traded their cattle for the fruit and grain of their 
agricultural neighbours. They are still condemned for maintaining ‘excessive numbers of 
useless cattle that deprived wildlife of water and grazing’ (Rutten, 2002:4). The 
Government thus reduces veterinary services to allow nature to assist in de-stocking 
(Mchome, 2002:106). In effect the ‘livestock industry has lost about $ 136 million over 
the past 14 years’ (The EastAfrican January 24, 2005). It must be remembered, however, 
that in the eyes of Maasai pastoralists there is nothing like ‘useless cattle.’ 
Most of them mostly sell a fraction of their livestock. Even then its contribution to ‘the 
economy’ is comparatively substantial. In 2001, for example, the livestock sector earned 
the Government in Arusha Region TShs.16.7 billion (Nipashe September 29, 2001). This 
sum, however, does not capture the non-monetarised livestock contributions like 
consumption, manure and draught power. The contribution of the sector outstrips by far 
that of the wildlife-based tourism industry. All protected areas in the same year 
contributed, if much, not more than TShs.10 billion in Arusha in the same year (Business 
Times March 3, 2000). And the Government supports wildlife and tourism. 
Next the paper turns to the most controversial problem facing the Maasai. 
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3. Land Alienation 
In the name of development the Maasai have lost a huge part of their ancestral land. 
Alienation of Maasai land for agriculture and for the interest of wildlife conservation is 
one of the main blights facing the Maasai in both Kenya and Tanzania. 
It is said Maasailand extends from Mkomazi through Upare to the southern foothills of 
Mount Kilimanjaro and runs northward between Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru, 
Olng’elata (Kivasis, 1953). To the West the Maasai took in the whole of Maasai Steppe 
extending southwards to include today known villages on the Handeni-Kondoa road, 
Swakini, Kijungu and Mgera. The extreme westerly limit is the West of the Serengeti 
(Fosbrooke, 1972). It is a large territory covering a total of 105,105 square kilometres. 
The Kenya/Tanzania border line cuts across Maasailand for kilometres stretching from 
West of Mara River to the eastern slopes of Kilimanjaro Mountain. During colonial time 
Maasailand was divided into four administrative Districts namely Narok and Kajiado in 
Kenya and Monduli and Kiteto in Tanzania (Parkipuny, 1975). 
The British came and condemned the Maasai for being wanderers who must be dealt with 
as such, virtually, to prevent them from ‘destroying the environment and wasting or 
under-utilising the land.’ Justice Moijo ole Keiwua notes with grave concerns: 
The British who came, saw and coveted the land disrupted communal land ownership. A hasty 
study of the Maasai was undertaken with equally hasty conclusions made. The rights of the 
Maasai to own their land had been watered down to mere grazing rights…Eliot cannot in 
fairness call the Maasai wanderers. Between the Maasai on their land, and the British who had 
wandered all the way from little England, who was a wanderer? (Keiwua, 2002). 
In Africa, like elsewhere, at the dawn of the 20th century the British used tricks and, more 
importantly, their military strength to alienate land to British settlers at expense of the 
local populations (Vambe, 1972). The British applied the same techniques to deprive the 
Maasai of their ancestral land (MAA, 2004). The problem is expressed well: 
The British tricked us! After we had been weakened by civil wars and droughts, they claimed 
that our Great Laibon, O’lonana, had signed an agreement in 1904 with His Majesty’s 
Commission for the East African Protectorate, leasing Kenya to the British. The Maasai would 
never have accepted such a lease! This would have confined us to an arid, dusty land of 
thousands of miles where the threat of drought…is imminent (Saibull & Carr, 1981). 
He is referring to the so-called ‘Anglo-Maasai Agreements’ prepared by the British 
colonialists on August 10, 1904. That ‘agreement’ was signed on August 15, 1904 
between the British colonial Government and the Maasai in Nairobi, the present day 
capital of Kenya. The Governor, Sir Donald Stewart, represented the British while 
Olonana ole Mbatiany ‘represented’ the Maasai. The ‘agreement’ stipulates that: 
The Masai leaders ‘of our own free will’, decided that it is for our best interests to remove our 
people, flocks, and herds into definite reservations away from the railway line, and away from 
any land that may be thrown open to European settlement (New York Times August 25,2004). 
Olonana had no mandate to sign away the Maasai land. He was neither Maasai leader nor 
representative. He was a mere medicine man. Commenting on the ‘agreements’ Justice 
Nzamba Kitonga, former Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya, argues: 
In these circumstances, you do not need a lawyer to tell you that the so called Anglo-Maasai land 
agreement was a gigantic fraud and has no binding effect upon the Maasai, the government of 
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the Republic of Kenya or any other person. And the government knows all this (The EastAfrican 
September 6, 2004). 
The Maasai on their part did not, and had no reason to, abide to a null and void 
agreement. To the Maasai, land was theirs and not a property to be owned like a horse by 
individuals. Any lease was, and still is, a foreign concept to them. They thus ignored it. 
The British effort was therefore in vain. The British colonialists came up with yet another 
‘agreement’ signed by the same sometimes in 1911. The Maasai reaction was immediate. 
In 1912 a group of Maasai, led by Mr Murket ole Nchoko, filed a suit in the court of 
Mombasa seeking to nullify ‘the agreement.’ The Maasai basic contention was that the 
elders who signed the agreement had no authority to ‘alienate the interest of minors and 
unborn children.’ But the case and a subsequent appeal were dismissed as the court ruled 
the agreement was actually a ‘treaty’ between two ‘states’ and that the court had no 
jurisdiction to handle such cases. The Maasai did not give up. They planned to lodge a 
final appeal in London. This was nipped in the bud when the protectorate quarantined the 
Maasai cattle when it learned of efforts to sell cattle and raise money to file the case (The 
EastAfrican August 16, 2004). It was clear that the Maasai were losers. 
The British told them to stay out, away from what used to be their land. They should stay 
far from the then Uganda Railway. The British equally robbed other Kenyans. Their 
misadventure in Nandiland is responsible for the famous Nandi Resistance 1850-97. Only 
when the Nandi were defeated, not easily, did the British take their land. Kikuyu, Embu, 
Meru, Kamba and other Kenyans were also deprived of their land. That was the rule 
wherever the British saw attractive land in Africa. They grabbed it. Everything grows on 
and off the land. Without land no life. The First and Second World Wars plus their 
consequences weakened the British. The turmoil between imperialists was itself 
development by contradiction. On the other hand Africans who were in the battlefields 
came home with arms and more military skills, the armed struggle against British rule 
was just around the corner. To survive the looming war the British had to live on 
Commissions. In 1932 they formulated the infamous Carter Land Commission. 
That Commission did not return any land to any Kenyan. Mau Mau, the militant African 
nationalist movement became a full-scale fight; The Mau Mau War 1952-6. It advocated 
violent resistance to British domination in Kenya (Maloba, 1998). It was especially 
associated with the ritual oaths employed by leaders of the Kikuyu Central Association to 
promote unity in the independence movement. In October 1952, after a campaign of 
sabotage and assassination attributed to Mau Mau fighters, the British Kenya 
Government declared a state of emergency. It began four years of military operations 
against Mau Mau fighters. By the end of 1956, more than 11,000 fighters had been killed 
in that war, along with about 100 Europeans and 2,000 African loyalists. More than 
20,000 other Africans were put into detention camps, where intensive efforts were made 
to convert them to the political views of the colonial Government, to abandon their 
nationalist aspirations. Despite these actions, Mau Mau resistance spearheaded the Kenya 
independence movement under Jomo Kenyatta (visit onwar.com). 
The British established the R.J.M. Swynnerton Commission in 1954. Swynnerton’s 
Report on How to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya was aimed 
at the privatisation of land ownership through the displacement of Indigenous Land 
Tenure systems and replacing it with a system that entrenched private property rights 
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along the lines of the English Land Law. The Swynnerton Plan, adopted in 1954, 
advocated individual land tenure and export cash crop production for Africans. The 
landless agricultural population was thus compelled to encroach on and overcrowd 
Maasai land. 
In the meantime the British saw clearly that they would never defeat the Mau Mau 
fighters. Only then did they succumb to ‘dialogue’ which means the Lancaster 
Constitution ‘talks’ of 1962. The war ended but the Maasai were marginalised. The leases 
giving British settlers the Maasai land, according to former Kajiado North MP John 
Keen, were premised on manipulation. This fact, Keen says, ‘has always been protested 
by the community leaders who walked out of Lancaster Constitution talks…over the 
issue. The Maasai leaders always walked out of the talks to protest the dubious agreement 
leasing their land to British settlers’ (The Standard August 30, 2004). 
Meanwhile in the Lancaster Constitution ‘talks’ the British succeeded in assuring that the 
African leaders who took over were going to protect the British interests. These were 
written in the new Constitutions (Mohiddin, 1981). An agreement was reached on the 
white highlands, the best land that was expropriated from Africans, in which select 
Africans would be permitted to buy some of the land there with money lent to them from 
the British Government in London (Gutto, 1981:54-5). The new leaders, including 
Kenyatta, who were once extremely adamant about the return of these lands, had no 
objections (Ake, 1986). Independence in Kenya, like elsewhere in Africa, was to be no 
more than a gradual Africanisation of the colonial administration (Fanon, 1967). 
On December 12, 1963 Kenya finally became ‘independent.’ Kenyatta became the first 
President of Kenya under Kenya African National Union, today better known as KANU. 
KANU ruled Kenya for nearly 40 years. Daniel T. Arap Moi assumed power following 
the sudden death of Kenyatta in 1978. What about the land question? It was never solved. 
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4. The Germans Version 
In Tanganyika, the Germans for their part pursued a similar policy and attempted to 
confine the Maasai to the South and East of ‘the Great North Road.’ They permitted the 
brothers Adolf and Friedrich Siedentopf to grab land in the Ngorongoro Crater and set 
aside the Serengeti for sheep farming (Parkipuny, 1975). The Siedentopfs tried 
unsuccessfully to exterminate wildlife to give room for two farms in the Crater (Grzimek, 
1960). Germans appropriated numerous farms around Mount Kilimanjaro and Meru. The 
Maasai sub-tribe, Ilkisonko from the plains of these mountains moved to Ngorongoro. 
The Maasai had to lose mountainous areas first. This is because, naturally and for very 
good reasons, they prefer to live on the plains rather than in the highlands. Maasai, 
though sentimentally attached to the highlands, prefers life on the plains. Cattle thrive 
better and fatten quicker there. Humans are less liable to bronchial trouble than in the 
damp, misty, highlands, and because the waters are temporary, malaria usually presents 
little problems. It is possible that Germans found few or no Maasai on the highlands, thus 
justifying land grabbing as the land was supposedly idle or underused or wasted. 
The ‘Sanya corridor’ comprised a series of German demarcated farms and ranches, such 
as the present day West Kilimanjaro ranch, which the British held back from re-alienation 
so as to allow the Maasai to the North and West of Kilimanjaro and Meru to cross over 
the saddle between the two mountains and utilise the grazing of the Sanya Plains and 
beyond. As part of boundary readjustments, which led to the notorious Meru land case, 
the Maasai lost this corridor and much of the Sanya Plains as well (Fosbrooke, 1972). In 
1955 Lolchoro area South of Arusha town was the scene of large-scale alienation. 
On the foothills of Mount Munduli where there is the comparative favourable climate, the 
colonialists appropriated huge lands for themselves. The notorious Monduli Coffee Estate 
was established in 1931 though it existed before that year. Frank Anderson, an Australian 
criminal, annexed for himself the land that was to become Rasha Rasha Coffee Estate. 
Mr. Joseph Benesta owned another massive Tarosero Coffee Estate whose remains can 
still be seen at the West of the present day headquarters of Monduli District. 
All told, Greek and Boer settlers attempted to establish wheat and sisal plantations in 
either side of the present day Arusha-Dodoma Road as far as the eye can see. However 
these farms did not succeed. But the plains still bear the names, Inganui, places of wheat 
and Irkatan, places of sisal in Maa language.  German settlers went as far as Lepurko and 
Losimingori where they established ranches. The present day Manyara ranch was 
established during or around that time. 
When the Germans were defeated in the First World War, according to the Versailles 
Treaty, they had to nominally lose their territories abroad. That was how Britain came to 
take over Tanganyika in the early 1920s. The war-weakened British could not start 
massive settler plantations in Tanganyika (Shivji, 1998). It opted for the ‘indirect rule’ 
policy which consisted of a campaign to settle peasants in Maasailand (Parkipuny, 1975). 
Meanwhile they established a few plantations and tried to develop those left by the 
Germans. Around 1926 the Oldeani coffee plantations started and led to the construction 
of the road from Mto-wa-Mbu, and a subsequent branch road to Mbulu which was 
previously approached from Mbugwe, or from the South via Dabil. The opening up of the 
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Oldeani also permitted Murrels, the then  District Commissioner Maasailand, to put the 
very first road up to the Crater rim from Kampi Nyoka around 1932 (for discussion see 
Fosbrooke, 1972). This was followed by the intensification of wildlife carnage and 
further marginalisation of Maasai who were already at their lowest ebb of suffering. 
In 1961 Tanganyika gained ‘independence.’ The new Government seemingly wanted to 
exceed the colonial ones by appropriating Maasai land. Nationalisation created over 400 
parastatals including a number of big agricultural and ranching corporations. District 
development corporations were also established. These and other state organs were 
involved in what are called ‘national projects.’ Village lands were alienated to state 
organs like the army and prison services without consultation of the villagers (see Lane, 
1996 & Shivji, 1998). This is how Oljoro National Service, Tanzania Military Academy, 
Makuyuni National Service, among others, acquired vast lands. 
In practice, lands taken over in the name of the state or in ‘public interest’ very frequently 
ended up being used for private benefit of the state bureaucracy and leaders. Alienation 
of over 100,000 of acres of pastoral land for the joint Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex - 
now a monument of bad development - in Hanang District of Arusha Region northern 
Tanzania stands as one of several prime examples (Lane, 1996). National Food 
Corporation and Tanzania Breweries established similar farms at Loliondo, Munduli Juu, 
and West Kilimanjaro. In short Maasai land alienation multiplied after colonialism. 
To add insult to injury, small-scale cultivation opened its mouth wide enough to threaten 
swallowing the remaining Maasai land. The Government supports the spontaneous and 
organic immigration of peasants onto rangelands, citing common rights of all citizens for 
resources within the borders of their country, irrespective of places of origin. Massive 
wildlife conservation areas were also created. 
5. False Promises 
In Kenya, Mau Mau struggle for independence was principally based on land. The 
KANU candidates won the first election on a platform committed to creating, according 
to KANU Manifesto, ‘a democratic African socialist Kenya’ (cited in Mohiddin, 
1981:38). No Professor in Double Standards could have divined that the same politicians 
almost the same time could make one of the biggest U-turns in Kenya politics. In a speed 
almost like that of light the socialists became imperialists (Babu, 1981). 
The Government of Kenya inherited a monstrously oppressive colonial system. It 
straightaway went to recognise the colonial legal framework with a few legislative 
amendments here and there. What followed is most striking. Remember that the British 
believe that they had the heavy ‘burden of civilising Africans.’ The colonialists came and 
condemned the Maasai for being wanderers who must be dealt with as such. 
By some twisted sense of logic, the British who had wandered all the way from little 
England, had the boldness to describe the Maasai as wanderers. This was, virtually, to 
prevent them from ‘wasting or under-utilising the land.’ They saw the Maasai way of life 
as ‘primitive.’ The new African leaders in Kenya proved to have little better 
understanding of pastoralism. They too considered pastoralism ‘backward.’ 
Likewise, in an uncalled-for rally to sedentarise the Maasai, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) set out 
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rolling into Kenya. They funded private ranches programmes against the Maasai will 
(Rutten, 1992). The Maasai, for example, categorically refused the setting up of ranches 
in Kajiado District. They were evicted. Water was piped from the Ngong Hills to the 
area. Then the farms were given to ‘progressive’ Maasai families. Such families were of 
Christian or Maasai urban dwellers (Parkipuny, 1975). So new style settlers were made. 
Meanwhile conservation areas, many of them in the Maasai territory, were established. 
The largest concentration of wildlife as well as wildlife-protected areas remaining on 
earth is in pastorals territories in East Africa. In Kenya alone they are Masai Mara 
Reserve, Amboseli National Park, Nairobi National Park, Tsavo [East & West] National 
Parks, Nakuru National Park and a host of private game sanctuaries. 
In Laikipia District 38 settlers whose ancestors came to Kenya during colonial times hold 
over one million acres leaving almost nothing to well over 40,000 Maasai. In Narok and 
Kajiado Districts Britain tests its new military hardware. ‘The British army has conducted 
live-fire weapons training in Kenya since 1945, when London was still the colonial ruler’ 
(visit irinnews.org). Two complex issues arise from the British military training in 
Maasailand. One, it has pushed the Maasai pastoralists off from their rangelands. Two, an 
‘estimated 500 Maasai herders from northern Kenya have been killed or seriously injured 
by ammunition left on the firing range’ (visit democracynow.org). 
Meanwhile politicians from other Kenyan communities openly encouraged further 
encroachments into Maasai pasturelands (Keiwua, 2002). In the Memorandum to the 
Njonjo Commission on Land Law from the Communities of Ololulunga and Melelo 
Locations of Narok District, the communities argued that: 
The Constitution of Kenya contains elaborate safeguards against violation of the right to private 
property. It matters not whether such private property is group owned land under the Land Act. 
Yet a Councillor from Mulot side, who in a public meeting called by the Provincial 
Commissioner, Rift Valley in 1999 to reconcile the Maasai and the Kipsigis, dared to say that 
the Kipsigis would continue to invade Maasai owned land until such time the Maasai had given 
birth to enough children to fill up their land (Mwenesi, undated). 
In Kajiado District encroachment into Maasai land is worse. The Maasai are becoming 
landless. In the Memorandum of Grievances to the Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Laws of Kenya, the communities of Iloodoariak and Moriso Land Adjudication Sections 
of Kajiado District made themselves heard clearly. Mwenesi again: 
We the distressed and deprived communities of Iloodoariak and Moriso were encouraged by the 
words of the Commission’s chairman who pledged to Kenya Public that all titles acquired 
otherwise than in strict accordance with the legal procedures will be cancelled. We believe you 
Mr. Chairman. We also believe that in this pledge your Commission has set out to put right what 
had been put wrong by the failure on the part of those who were supposed to impartially and 
disinterestedly administer the law. 
It was the waywardness in the non-application or observance of the clear and unambiguous 
provisions of the Land Adjudication Act (Cap.284) that is responsible for our being deprived of 
our ancestral lands… The provisions had been misused and abused by a no less a person than the 
then Minister for Lands and Settlement, whose wife, despite not being an ordinary resident of 
any of these sections, was enabled by equally unscrupulous Government officials to acquire two 
farms, one in each of these Land Adjudication Sections. To our mind, that was the clearest case 
of abuse of office. We are at a loss why this-well known-then-Minister has not been made to 
face the full force of the law (Mwenesi, undated). 
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The struggle for a fair land tenure and security of land for all proved ineffective 
throughout the KANU rule. Evictions, massive corruption and violence were a rule rather 
than an exception during the rule of ex-President Daniel Arap Moi. 
6. The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born 
Corruption and lawlessness forced Kenyans to a historical political action. For the first 
time since ‘independence’ KANU was defeated in the general election in 2002. 
The newcomers won through the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This fragile 
alliance of more than 10 opposition political parties cobbled together in the last few 
months before the election, promised a new Constitution and to fight corruption. But the 
new actors are a recycling of old guards. Far from representing any political break from 
Moi and KANU, NARC is made up of top KANU leaders, many of whom jumped ship in 
the last few months as internal divisions wracked KANU and Moi lost his grip on power. 
Mwai Kibaki, the President, himself was Moi’s Vice-President from 1978 to 1988. He 
only stood against Moi in the elections of 1991 and 1997, when Kenya’s elite agreed to 
hold multiparty elections under pressure from the West. One of the NARC leaders is 
George Saitoti, Vice-President of Moi until September 2002. Moi sacked him for not 
supporting his chosen candidate, son of Kenyatta. He was finance Minister in the 1990s 
and is implicated in scams in which hundreds of millions of dollars were looted. Whether 
NARC is going to deliver the new Constitution of Kenya remains to be seen. 
The Maasai struggle for their land continued nevertheless. It only took the new shape in 
August 2004. The Maasai demonstrated in Nairobi and across the Rift Valley Province, 
which used to be their territory. Their message was a simple one: ‘We need our land 
back’ (The EastAfrican August 16, 2004). John Letai is the President of the Organisation 
for Indigenous Peoples of Africa (OIPA). He says, with some bitterness, that: 
The Laikipia situation has been rather volatile. We have the ravaging drought killing thousands 
of our animals while we are seating on a gold mine. The land next to us is electrified with all the 
lush pasture. Elephants, zebras and all other herbivores are having a holiday in these so called 
settler ranches while the rightful owners whom history deprived of this gold mine are 
languishing in abject poverty (pers.comm September 11, 2004). 
The police suppressed, by brute force, the demonstrations. An elderly Maasai, Mr Ndinai 
Moiyare, was reportedly shot dead by the police and many others were wounded. Then 
over 120 were arrested. The actual damage suffered by the Maasai in terms of lives, 
injuries, and loss of property during their clashed with the Kenyan police is not clear. The 
Government of Kenya is still sitting on the figures. Its reaction to this rather chilling 
matter was unfair. One gets the sense of an institution that has lost its way, departed from 
its mandate, became confused about what it is exactly doing and why. The confusion is 
captured in the words of the Minister for Lands, Amos Kimunya. He notes with pride: 
There were no 99-year leases, as far as I am concerned. If there are any I would be happy to look 
at them. From my own list of all these places, I can see 999-year leases...I am asking the people 
not to attempt to invade private property (Daily Nation August 25, 2004). 
In his kind of logic the Kenyan Constitution protects stolen property. Nzamba Kitonga, 
former chairman of the Law Society of Kenya, tells him to eat his heart out: 
The Minister of Lands, Amos Kimunya, being the man currently at the wheel, should not make 
impulsive, shortsighted, makeshift policy statements. He must understand that his long-awaited 
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appointment with history has come…[the Government] also knows that because the agreement 
was illegal, it is immaterial whether it was for 99 hours, 99 days, 99 months, 99 years, 999 years 
or 999 centuries. He must in this new dispensation resolve the land question in Kenya once and 
for all (The EastAfrican, September 6, 2004). 
It is exceedingly unlikely that politicians in Kenya will listen. They have ‘no intention of 
following Mr Mugabe’s example. Uprooting the ranches, government officials said, 
would be disastrous for the economy, which relies heavily on Western assistance and on 
tourism, a major source of hard currency’ (New York Times August 25, 2004). 
The matter has caused a rift among politicians in Kenya. While the ‘leaders acknowledge 
the community has genuine grievances, they are quarrelling over how to address the 
issue’ (visit.allafrica.com). Francis ole Kaparo is the Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament. 
The Maasai levelled grave charges against him. The charges, most of which he 
strenuously denied, includes this one from a Kenyan who requested anonymity: 
As far as the politicians are concerned, Ntimama, Nkaiserry, Konchella have come out in 
support of the Maasai. The Pastoralist Parliamentary Group has also visited…and issued a 
statement in support of the Maasai. The media and clergy for the first time have also supported 
the Maasai and urged the government to address the Maasai issue once and for all. Unfortunately 
Kaparo who happens to be the speaker of the national assembly and coming from the area does 
not see sense in all these. He has been brain washed by the…settlers. 
These are just allegations. However Kaparo has never convincingly denied them. What is 
in records is something to this effect: ‘Yesterday, Speaker Francis ole Kaparo maintained 
“outsiders” who also wanted to undermine him politically were inciting disorder in 
Laikipia District in the name of seeking land ownership redress’ (visit.allafrica.com). 
Accused number one is John Keen who is the former MP for Kajiado North.  
His sin? He stated: ‘It is criminal and immoral to let their [Maasai] cows die by denying 
them access to ancestral land taken away by colonial cheats.’ William ole Ntimama, 
Minister in the Office of the President of Kenya in charge of Public Service, is also 
‘being accused of inciting his community to invade private land’ (The EastAfrican 
August 30, 2004). 
The meeting called to discuss ways of settling the Maasai demand for land was held in 
the 10th floor conference room of Harambee House, Nairobi, on September 07, 2004. It 
was called by Dr Chris Murungaru, National Security Minister, to ask Maasai and 
Samburu leaders to pacify those of their people who had started to invade lavish settler 
farms in Laikipia. Murungaru chaired the meeting. William ole Ntimama attended. Other 
who took part in the meeting were Education Minister George Saitoti (Kajiado North), 
assistant Ministers Gideon Konchellah (Kilgoris), Simeon Lesirma (Samburu West), and 
Mwangi Kiunjuri (Laikipia East), and MPs Joseph ole Nkaiserry (Kajiado Central), G.G. 
Kariuki (Laikipia West) and National Assembly Speaker Francis ole Kaparo. Participants 
suggested that KShs 10 billion as a possible compensation figure for the land the Maasai 
lost in Laikipia District alone. Ntimama, it is reported, stood up straight and said: 
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…the battle for lost land would not end until the Maasai were given compensation…The Maasai 
were not demanding that they should be allowed to go back to their lost farms but instead should 
be compensated for their land3. 
They concluded that the Maasai do indeed ‘have outstanding issues that require attention’ 
(visit. gumii.org). In the eyes of pastoralists in Kenya, ‘the few commercial ranchers, 
regardless of their ethnic background or when they acquired the land, represents the 
forces of dispossession that dates back 100 years ago’(Daily Nation August 25, 2004). 
7. A Complex Situation 
What about the settlers? Many of them have no idea that they are living on a borrowed 
time. For example Jeremy Block, a descendant of British settlers told Reuters, ‘They 
have invaded all the ranches around here, they have destroyed an awful lot of property 
and it is time for law and order to take control. ’ The thinking continues ‘The police need 
to be harsher…There need to be more arrests. We need quicker, more forceful action’ 
(New York Times August 25, 2004). Some settlers, however, beg to differ. 
In a telling admission, Michael Dyer, a settler of British ancestry who own 32,000-acre 
Borana ranch in Laikipia, sees the problem. Dyer cleared his chest: ‘Everyone knows 
there is a land issue here. It is causing quite a lot of distress now to the [Maasai] 
community…My feeling would be let’s get everyone around the table and let’s get some 
proper interpretation of the Maasai agreements, and let’s start the process of 
reconciliation’ (visit news.bbc.co.uk). But the Maasai say it is too late. 
The BBC reports that Simon ole Kaparo, one of several Maasai front liners in the 
struggle, says the time for dialogue is gone and that the Maasai will not accept any deal 
short of the return of all their land. He argues in no uncertain terms, ‘There will be no 
dialogue.’ He added: ‘We didn’t have any dialogue for 100 years, why should we have 
one now. We can’t have any dialogue now...We want our land back.’ 
One of the arguments put forward in defence of settlers is that the Maasai will destroy the 
land. There is a stark and visible contrast between the different regions of Laikipia 
Maasai areas are bare and brown, the grass is baked a bright yellow in the dry season and 
there is little sign of wildlife. The settlers’ ranches are lusher and vast herds of wildlife 
roam behind electric fences. Dr. Lotte Hughes, an East African historian at St Antony’s 
College, Oxford explains: ‘They were confined to reserves, banned from leaving them’ 
(visit guardian.co.uk). 
The Maasai demonstrated towards the British High Commission in Nairobi. They 
wanted to tell the British Government in London through the British High Commissioner 
to Kenya to take responsibility of Maasai landlessness, which springs from British 
colonialism. John Letai, President of OIPA, notes: 
On the 13th August we held a national wide demonstration and presented memorandums to the 
Kenya Government and attempted to present to the British High Commission but because of the 
colonial mentality and arrogance he refused to meet the Nairobi team and instead referred them 
to a gate keeper whose only job in that embassy is to record vehicles coming in and going out. 
We held a second attempt on the 24th and hell broke loose. Our Governments as you know are 
                                                 
3 To my understanding, cattle, goats, sheep, camels and donkeys eat grasses NOT money. Thus the land 
redistribution agenda should not be compromised. Secondly there is no contradiction between fighting for 
land redistribution and seeking compensation for the same. 
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subjects of colonial masters and yokes of dictatorship. It let the police disperse peaceful 
Maasai…(pers.comm September 11, 2004). 
To this day of writing the British Government said nothing concerning the conflict. The 
Kenyan Government too has pushed the contradictions under the carpet, from which they 
will surely emerge sooner or later probably in a more ferocious form. 
The wildlife-based tourism business complicates further the possibility for land 
redistribution. For this particular reason the paper looks at how the income accrued from 
the sector is shared in the efforts to achieve development in both Kenya and Tanzania. 
8. The National Income Factor 
In Kenya and Tanzania, and throughout underdeveloped countries, ‘the economy’ is used 
to justify tempestuous decisions which hurt the poor of the world (for uncompelled 
illustration see Hancock, 1989). For this particular reasons the paper examines, albeit 
briefly, the beneficiary of the national income in the two East African countries. 
The Maasai are victims of ‘development’ in general but wildlife conservation in 
particular. Serengeti National Park, Tarangire National Park, Lake Manyara National 
Park, Arusha National Park, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Maasai Mara Reserve, 
Amboseli National Park, Nairobi National Park, Tsavo [East and West] National Parks, 
Mkomazi Game Reserve, to mention a few examples, are in or adjacent to what was, and 
still is, the Maasai territory. What do they get out of wildlife conservation? 
In the two countries, the tourism industry is based on wildlife conservation. It is 
considered the jet engine empowering the exchequers. The two Governments benefit 
financially and rhetorically from the tourism sector. It is often argued that policies must 
serve political, social, and cultural as well as economic ends. But the revenue earned 
from the tourism sector is much more of a priority for the international multimillion 
companies and Governments officials than the plight of rural people, especially the poor. 
Land allocated to wildlife conservation is reserved for tourists and investors who are 
mostly foreigners. Foreign investors reap as much profit as possible. In both Kenya and 
Tanzania ‘much of the foreign currency that comes in through such sectors as tourism 
gets siphoned out’ (The EastAfrican February 28, 2005). In Tanzania for example, the 
Executive Director of the Tanzania Tourist Board, a Government body for promotion of 
tourism, said with admirable if astonishing frankness: 
foreign investors own about 80% of the entire tourist hotels and lodges. They own nearly 90% of 
the air travel and about 90% of tourist hunting business and transport. About 60% of all tour 
operator firms (Business Times December 28, 2001). 
Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Union William Hanna, said, 
‘During the European summer the long-haul jets have been full of tourists arriving in 
Tanzania’ (Utalii August, 2001). Professor Seithy Chachage, of the University of Dar es 
Salaam adds: ‘…just after Christmas in 1996, two chartered planes landed in Zanzibar, 
straight from Italy with more than 2,000 tourists who were going to spend their time in 
the beaches of Zanzibar and then fly to Arusha and back home’ (Chachage, 2000:186). 
At this point one may make some financial assumptions. One: assume the said 2,000 
tourists visited Ngorongoro Conservation Area which is in the Arusha Region. They were 
accommodated in a foreign owned hotel for two days. Each tourist paid, to be lenient, a 
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total of US $ 150 fees for all hotel expenses per day. The hotel owner (X) earned a total 
of US $ 600,000 in two days. Let this amount be what X earned in that year. 
Two: assume the said planes belong to another investor (Y). A tourist paid US $ 2400 as 
air fair for the whole safari. Y earned a gross total of US $ 4,800,000 in 1996. 
British Airway and KLM are the leading airlines ferrying tourists to and fro Tanzania, not 
Air Tanzania. The vast majority of Tanzanians live far below the ‘poverty line’; in 2001 
the income was US $ 246 per capita, that is to say l less than US $ 1 per day (visit 
tanzania.go.tz). 
Remember the average income per capita is obtained by an arithmetically equal 
distribution of wealth, which no Utopia is expected to achieve. Even then, an average 
Tanzanian would have to work for over 2,430 and 19,500 years to earn what X and Y 
respectively earned in just one short year. And the average life expectancy is estimated at 
48 years. What is true about Tanzania is similarly the case in Kenya. 
This is a parasitic stratum which strengthened tour and travel companies in the same way 
in which local communities are weakened. It is polarisation of wealth and poverty at two 
opposite extremes. It is all sheer robbery, criminal plunder of the weak by the strong. To 
borrow a line from Dr. Walter Rodney, ‘capitalism is parading in without even a loin 
cloth to cover its nakedness.’ In the strictly economic sense, without any political 
undertones, any multiplier effect not only spills outside the two countries, but spills most 
often into the pockets of those who do not need it; lavishly rich western investors. 
9. Will They Survive? 
This sounds a simple question capable of a straight answer, but in point of fact it raises 
several complicated issues. In this concluding part only a few issues will be examined. 
Foremost natural calamities, particularly the 1890 disaster and also many other severe 
drought periods weakened the Maasai (Fosbrooke, 1972). Secondly, the intervention of 
colonial administration and subsequently the ‘independent’ Governments worsened their 
situation. Currently, an alienation from an adequate independent source of food and 
income is evident. (Parkipuny, 1991). All this combined hits the Maasai pastoralists hard. 
The net result is that they have become increasingly vulnerable to drought, subsequent 
food shortages and famines. They are forced in an unpleasant state of limbo.  
Occasionally clashes occur. In 2004 in Tanzania for example the landed resources-based 
conflict between the Maasai and the Sonjo communities in Ngorongoro District left many 
people wounded and the vast majority being displaced in both sides. This is not an 
islolated case and it is definitely not the worst. In 2000, again in Tanzania, a simmering 
conflict between the Maasai pastoralist and peasants in the Morogoro Region erupted 
claiming dozens of lives, homes razed to the ground and several people wounded. 
Neither is this man-made disaster confined to Tanzania alone. It is, apparently, becoming 
the order of the day in Kenya. The most recent example illustrates the point just made. At 
least 40 people had died, dozens serious injuries and hundreds have fled their homes 
following the clashes that broke out in Mai Mahiu and Mandera, about 60 kilometres 
southwest of Nairobi (The Standard, February 14, 2005). The bone of contention is the 
use of River Ewaso Kedong’ whose volume of water has been reduced drastically 
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because of the current drought. The Maasai, who live downstream, claim their 
neighbours, the Kikuyu, upstream are using the river water for irrigation, thereby 
complicating the drought situation for them and their livestock (The EastAfrican, January 
24, 2005). The area was ‘traditionally roamed by nomadic Maasai cattle herders but 
settled since the 1970s by small-scale farmers from the Kikuyu community’ (visit 
news.scotsman.com). These trends seem, unfortunately, to be escalating. 
Meanwhile, extreme poverty is causing the Maasai to move into towns were they are 
employed to do petty jobs, which are humiliating and demeaning. The following sentence 
sum-up the Maasai situation: the Maasai ‘have undergone serious transformations and… 
they can no longer be idealised as a group of nomadic wanderers, as often portrayed in 
beautiful picture books for tourist market’ (Dietz & Mohamed Salih, 1997). Stopping this 
downward slide, let alone revising it, is next to impossible (Chambers, 1983:138). 
Those interested in peace and stability in the region, the Governments of Kenya and 
Tanzania included, are advised to put in place policies which will minimise these 
tragedies. The most important of all being fair and secure land tenure. At the same time, 
the Governments should ensure a fair distribution of all resources for the benefit of all. 
Professor Yash Pal Ghai, Chair of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2000-
4), argues that landlessness ‘need to be resolved through national policies with sensitivity 
to the special problems and needs of particular communities’ (2005). 
Back to the survival question. The answer is quite resoundingly and unequivocally, ‘yes, 
of course, yes.’ If by Maasai survival one is talking of a dynamic society in future times 
as opposed to a ‘static’ people that depend on the creators of their misery, one is 
optimistic. There is no reason for sinking under the load of despair. 
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